North Dakota Law Review
Volume 10

Number 5

Article 9

1934

Lux Et Al. vs. State
North Dakota Law Review Associate Editors

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr

Recommended Citation
North Dakota Law Review Associate Editors (1934) "Lux Et Al. vs. State," North Dakota Law Review: Vol.
10 : No. 5 , Article 9.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol10/iss5/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

BAR BRIEFS

LUX ET AL vs. STATE
252 N. W. 897 (Neb.)
Syllabus by the Court
1. Section 20-2121, Comp. St. 1929, specifically gives every court
of record power to punish by fine and imprisonment, or by either,
"Any wilful attempt to obstruct the proceedings, or hinder the due
administration of justice in any suit, proceedings, or process pending
before the courts."
2. An information charging constructive contempt, if made by
a county attorney, when direct and positive in its charging part, need
not be verified positively but may be made on information and belief.
Tasich v. State, 111 Neb. 465, 196 N. W. 688.
3. "The granting or refusing of a continuance of a criminal cause
rests in the sound discretion of the court, and a ruling in that regard
will not be disturbed on review, in the absence of a showing of an
abuse of discretion." Dinsmore v. State, 61 Neb. 418, 85 N. W. 445.
4. The so called Foreclosure Moratorium Act, Laws 1933, c. 65,
Comp. St. Supp. 1933, §§ 20-21,159 to 20-21,164, is not available to
defendants.
5. The fines of defendants were neither excessive nor inconsistent.
Error to District Court, Saline County; Proudfit, Judge.
Harry M. Lux and Robert Jackson, also known as D. Robert
Burleigh, were found guilty of contempt of court, and they bring error.
Affirmed.
Heard before GOSS, C. J., and ROSE and PAINE, JJ., and
CHASE and ELDRED, District Judges.
GOSS, Chief Justice.
Harry M. Lux and Robert Jackson, also known as D. Robert
Burleigh, hereinafter called defendants, were found guilty of contempt
of court. Lux was ordered to pay a fine of $250 and certain costs,
Burleigh to pay a fine of $100 and certain costs, and to be committed
to jail until such fines and costs were paid. After their motions for
new trials were overruled they brought proceedings in error. No bill
of exceptions was secured. Only the transcript was brought up.
The information charged these and fourteen other defendants with
the execution of a concerted plan and wilful attempt to impede and
obstruct the due administration of justice in a described cause then
pending in the district court for Saline county for the foreclosure of a
real estate mortgage and a sale thereunder. It alleged that the sheriff
had been duly ordered by the court to sell said real estate at the east
front door of the county court house at 1 o'clock p. m. on March 14,
1933; that about ten minutes before the hour so set, the defendants and
many others, with intent to prevent the sale, assembled in the private
office of the sheriff, locked the door so he could not go to officiate
at the sale, locked the windows and disconnected the telephone, so he
could not communicate with any one outside said office; though he
told 'them about three minutes before he was to open the sale that -he
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had that legal duty to perform, the defendants informed the sheriff
that he could not hold any foreclosure sale on that day, crowded him so
he could not move, took hold of his person and stood around him in a
menacing manner, prevented him from leaving the office, wilfully and
unlawfully held him in his office against his will for about an hour
and thereby prevented him from making the sale. The sheriff was
finally released, when some were ejected forcibly from the office by
citizens of Wilber and others were dispersed therefrom by a tear gas
bomb which was thrown into said room.
Harry M. Lux filed an "answer and showing" in opposition to the
information. In this he described himself as "a resident of Lancaster
county, Nebraska, and has been working for and is now employed as
an organizer for the Holiday Association, * * * and that he was in
Wilber on or about March 14, 1933, being interested in the prosperity
of the rural communities and their accomplishments thru collective
effort. That he was not a leader of any group or gathering but here
for the purpose of being informed of the results growing out of the
moratorium act and other legislation for the interest of the rural communities. * * * That no acts transpired by him or his associates that
did intimidate, suppress, or in any manner hinder or violate the free,
voluntary actions of any court official. Defendant generally denies each
and every material allegation in the complaint. * * * That the acts * * *

of this defendant were harmonious, lawful and in accord with the rights
of every citizen of the United States to lawfully assemble and discuss
their inherent rights."
(1) Defendants assign that the district court was without power
or jurisdiction to punish them for contempt in such manner or form
and that the records fail to show any obstruction or hindrance.
Section 20-2121, Comp. St. 1929, specifically gives every court
of record power to punish by fine and imprisonment, or by either, "Any
wilful attempt to obstruct the proceedings, or hinder the due administration of justice in any suit, proceedings, or process pending before the
courts."
(2) The form of the information is clear and specific. It was
not attacked by demurrer or by motion to quash. True, it was not
verified positively but was verified by the county attorney upon information and belief, but this court held, in Tasich v. State, 111 Neb. 465,
196 N. W. 688, that an information in a constructive contempt case,
made by a county attorney, when direct and positive in its charging
part, need not be verified positively but may be made upon information
and belief.
While the defendants did not bring up the bill of exceptions and
therefore we do not have the evidence before us, the legal inference
from the final order appealed from is that the facts charged were
presented by evidence to the trial court and justified the findings and
judgment.
(3) Error is assigned because the court did not grant what
counsel for defendants considered sufficient time to prepare the defense. The record shows the information was filed March. 1,7, 1933.
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On the same day an order to show cause was issued and defendants
were at once served with copies of the complaint. The order to show
cause gave them five days notice and set the hearing for March 23rd.
Defendants employed counsel March 18th. March 23rd they moved for
a continuance (without suggesting a date). The court continued the
case to the next day. The trial began on March 24, 1933. The journal
entry of that day recites that all defendants were present in court
"and all being represented by counsel, except the defendant, Sylvester
Mendoza, * * * all announce that they are ready to proceed to trial."
"The granting or refusing of a continuance of a criminal cause rests
in the sound discretion of the court, and a ruling in that regard will
not be disturbed on review, in the absence of a showing of an abuse
of discretion." Dinsmore v. State, 61 Neb. 418, 85 N. W. 445. See
Ringer v. State, 114 Neb. 404, 207 N. W. 928; Biddick v. State, 113
Neb. 851, 205 N. W. 572; Dilley v. State, 97 Neb. 853, 151 N. W. 946.
(4) Defendants say the district court erred in failing to take
into consideration the Act of March 2, 1933, known as the Foreclosure
Moratorium Act. Laws 1933, c. 65, Comp. St. Supp. 1933, §§ 20-21,159
to 20-21,164. The first section makes that act usable "upon application
of the owner or owners of said real estate or persons liable on said
mortgages," etc. There is nothing in the record suggesting the right
or power of these defendants to invoke the provisions of the act. They
were neither owners nor liable on the mortgage. All inferences from
the record indicate that they were uninvited strangers, crashing the
doors, who now seek to avoid punishment for their bad legal manners.
(5) Defendants complain that the fines imposed are inconsistent
because of their difference. They ask, "If both parties are equally
guilty of contempt of court, or conduct constituting contempt of court,
why should not their fines be the same ?" The answer would be found
in the evidence, which is not before us. We assume the court had good
reason to decide that Lux was more of a leader and organizer of the
raid than Burleigh. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court. The fines of defendants were neither excessive nor inconsistent. The defendants were fortunate that they were let off with
fines; the statute authorized imprisonment. In Tasich v. State, supra,
prosecuted for attempting to obstruct the administration of justice
(but not succeeding in the attempt), the district court committed the
defendant to jail for six months and this court affirmed the judgment.
Here the defendants ,succeeded in preventing the judicial sale.
Under our plan of government the judicial department may not
lawfully be intimidated by threats, coerced by force, or influenced by
anything outside the facts and the law. It was timely and fortunate
for the cause of law and order that the unlawful scheme of defendants
was promptly frustrated by a resolute prosecutor and a courageous
judge.
The judgment was right and it is
Affirmed.

